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ABSTRACT
Capturing the Resilience Dividend:
Post Hurricane Sandy Insights from Brooklyn’s Sea Gate Community
Alexander Mitchell Rezk

This research project presents a resilience, governance, and vulnerability analysis of
populations traditionally considered as non-vulnerable to natural disasters and climate related
events. The paper examines how homeowners in Sea Gate, a neighborhood located on
Coney Island, in Brooklyn, New York, experienced systemic disruption following Hurricane
Sandy. This research sets out to answer the following questions: How does the lived
experience of homeowners in a coastal community reflect the creation of newly vulnerable
populations in regard to natural disasters in New York City? How is the current municipal
resilience strategy being perceived as managing these shifts? And finally, what avenues does
this discourse open to better prepare resilience strategists to accommodate the needs of
citizens on the front lines of climate risk in a major city such as New York? Currently,
resilience planning in New York City is focused on shoring up the region’s economic
hotspots and areas of high urban activity, but vulnerable residential coastlines throughout the
city are being left to fend for themselves under these present policy initiatives. Open-ended
interviews were conducted with residential homeowners in Sea Gate who were adversely
affected by Hurricane Sandy, i.e. experienced economic and property loss because of storm
damage, to elucidate this dichotomy. The paper argues that the current state of perceived
vulnerability exceeds both the historical governmental capacity for an organized response to
future natural disasters following Hurricane Sandy and the perceived priorities of the
municipal administration. Thus, the paper demonstrates that resilience planning is a political
process and must consider the perspectives and needs of citizens in coastal communities to
ensure more equitable and representative policies are enacted to protect such households
from future damage due to institutional unpreparedness.
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Coastal Resilience as a Conceptual Framework
In the present era of hyper-awareness both to the uncertain nature of our changing
climate and the recurrent nature of major natural disasters, resilience has emerged as a
guiding principle within the policy sphere for those seeking to ensure future stability for atrisk regions and population centers. As Meerow et al. point out, the annual number of
citations regarding “resilience” as a framing issue have skyrocketed since 2006. However,
they claim that the rise in use of the term has been steadily accompanied by an equally large
number of definitions. This very malleability could possibly be why the term itself is so very
attractive to various parties. They warn, however, that this ubiquity could prove problematic,
for if its endless malleability is abused, the term could be rendered meaningless or too
confusing, in a similar fashion to past buzzwords such as sustainability. For example, the
malleability of the term could potentially serve as a facilitator to interdisciplinary
collaboration, though on the other hand, if every field has its own internal definition it could
stifle this process. In the present moment, the tentative nature of a unifying definition still
has the potential to make it difficult to fully operationalize the concept. (2016) Nonetheless,
an increasing number of experts are beginning to hone in on a central definition that can be
credibly reiterated amongst various sources. In its 2012 report on resilience building,
USAID states that resilience can be defined as “the ability of people, households,
communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and
stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth”
(USAID 2012: 5). Meanwhile, this same definition can also be evidenced in the writing of
Neil Adger where he defines resilience as, “the capacity of linked social-ecological systems
to absorb recurrent disturbances such as hurricanes or floods so as to retain essential
structures, processes, and feedbacks.” (Adger et al. 2005) A similar definition can be found
across a range of publications (Walker et al., Kreimer et al., NOAA, the IPCC, Klein et al.).
This paper employs Brown et al.’s definition of resilience. They state that resilience can be
classified as:
“The capacity of an individual, community or institution to dynamically and
effectively respond to shifting climate circumstances while continuing to function at
an acceptable level. This definition includes the ability to resist or withstand impacts,
as well as the ability to recover and re-organize in order to establish the necessary
functionality to prevent catastrophic failure at a minimum and the ability to thrive at
best. Resilience is thus a spectrum, ranging from avoidance of breakdown to a state
where transformational change is possible” (2012).
While the myriad definitions of resilience touch on the same points, ultimately
reproducing a comprehensive image of resistant and adaptable systems, which can shift and
adapt to disruption and change. Yet, they all neglect a key point. None of these definitions of
resilience explicitly discuss the resilience of smaller groups of individuals within larger
wholes. Systems, either urban or ecological, occupy most of the space in discourse on
1

resilience at the present moment. While systemic and infrastructural resilience is indeed
important, it is only possibly when the whole is as strong as the sum of its parts, and the
people on the ground, the residents of those most geographically and environmentally
vulnerable points of habitation, must be accounted for in any coherent policy enacted with
the intent of creating a more resilient community of any kind. Therefore, smaller
communities who face immediate risk from coastal vulnerability must be better investigated
in order to deepen this discourse. It is to elucidate this notion that this paper will venture to
Sea Gate to describe the stories of the people there.
Amidst this backdrop, the City of New York states that it desires to be a resilient city
that is: “...first, protected by effective defenses and adapted to mitigate most climate impacts;
and second, able to bounce back more quickly when those defenses are breached from time
to time.” (NYC 2013) To understand where this framing emerges from within the regional
context, one must look to the definitions available from actors involved with New York
State, such as Judith Rodin, President of The Rockefeller Foundation. In her text, she defines
resilience stating: “Resilience is the capacity of any entity—an individual, a community, an
organization, or a natural system—to prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and
stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience…You also develop a greater
capacity to bounce back…” (Rodin 2014). The similarities are striking. It cannot be
overlooked that Rodin indeed played at least some role in the formulation of policy emerging
from New York State as a whole. Her own biographical statement on The Rockefeller
Foundation “about” pages states that, “In November 2012, New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo named Dr. Rodin to co-chair the NYS 2100 Commission on long-term resilience
following Superstorm Sandy” (TRF). The NYS 2100 was the first major policy initiative to
be launched in New York State after Superstorm Sandy, and as such, it heavily informed and
inspired the revised PlaNYC document which would emerge the following year.
Emerging policies and rhetoric frame resilience as a dichotomy between the City as
represented by the administrative or governing body at the front lines and the natural
disasters that will lead to crisis, not necessarily factoring in the actual citizens who lie in that
path of potential danger. All three iterations of New York’s policy packages: PlaNYC: A
Greener Greater New York, PlaNYC A Stronger more Resilient New York, and Mayor
DeBlasio’s One New York partake in this narrative. For examples of how these concepts are
currently playing out, we can look at two major international endeavors on this front. Both
the 100 Resilient Cities program and the C40 Cities initiatives stand out as benchmarks. In
the case of 100 Resilient Cities, their self-stated mission is: “100 Resilient Cities—Pioneered
by the Rockefeller Foundation (100RC) is dedicated to helping cities around the world
become more resilient to the physical, social and economic challenges that are a growing part
of the 21st century.” (100resilientcities.org). Here again, Rodin’s Rockefeller perspective is
evident. New York City was the first metropolis to join the network, and its net benefits
included gaining a Chief Resilience Officer, support for the development of resilience
strategies, and access to a vast partner network. (100resilientcities.org) Quite similarly, C40
bills itself in a similar fashion, stressing its network of over 80 cities, it’s supposed 600
2

million constituents and an active involvement with a full quarter of the global economy.
(C40.org/about) Primarily, then, C40 sees itself as a city created and city led initiative to
further the cause of urban green-economy conversion.
Thus, the grand narrative of city administrations versus the vagaries of coming crisis
ends up becoming the overarching story behind urban resilience. In this tale, cities form vast
networks, often with the help of major financial institutions, such as banks or private equity,
creating markets of resilience. Though “stakeholders” and multilateral decision making are
touted on paper as instrumental to true resilience, the power to control and formulate policy
flows in the standard direction from the state or private sector down to the people. Another
pertinent statement Rodin published on The Rockefeller Foundation website reads, “…It
requires upfront investment both in terms of financing and resources. It requires innovation
to solve for known vulnerabilities but also for variables unknown. And it takes partnerships
with the private sector, both to uncover weaknesses within systems, but to also unleash the
full range of financing for resilience projects and infrastructure.” It continues, “Resilience
should be a positive selling-point that cities volunteer to attract the best and the brightest, just
as they might promote their livability scores, vibrant arts scene or new transportation
investments”.1 The truth of the situation, however, depends on where along the chain of
command one sits. To those authoring policy, it may seem that forward thinking initiatives
are well underway. To those people whose homes sit outside of the limelight, and whose
vulnerability to coastal encroachment and natural disasters increases with each passing year,
like the residents of Sea Gate, progress toward increased resilience is perceived as slow,
when it is perceived at all.

Coastal Resilience Policy in New York City
In order to achieve its vision of “Our Resilient City”, the current New York resilience
policy document clearly states the priority of the policy is to achieve three goals. These are,
“Eliminate disaster-related displacement of more than one year of New Yorkers from homes
by 2050; reduce the Social Vulnerability Index for neighborhoods across the city; and reduce
average annual economic losses resulting from climate-related events.” (One New York 214)
These seem, on the surface, to be noble enough causes. However, one must question by what
means exactly they could be achieved in unison. Furthermore, a general air of vague
optimism dogs the sections that discuss actually ensuring future resilience. For instance, this
introductory passage closes with the statement that adaptation is needed and the situation is
dire, though hope is not all lost, because the opportunity to buy down future risk still exists if
the proper investments are made forthwith. (One New York 218)
This sensibility permeates much of the policy package, as time and again, economically
incentivized initiatives are cited as progress where substantive physical improvements to city
1

https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/realizing-resilience-dividend/

3

infrastructure or potential resilience are difficult to discern. For example, many initiatives
within the document can seem arbitrary, or metric-motivated rather than well considered or
impactful. In one case, rather than explaining a specific plan of action, the city cites the,
“RISE: NYC, a $30 million competition that leverages innovative resiliency technologies in
energy infrastructure, telecommunications, and building systems for small businesses.”
(ONY 226) When researching what exactly this is, one sees that it is indeed a competition
intended to foster innovation in partnership with the private engineering firm Buro-Happold
in conjunction with the New York City Economic Development Corporation or NYCEDC,
without stated benefits or outcomes. Most troublingly, and most specific to this study, this
shallow strategy is being employed in the actual formulation of infrastructural interventions
for coastal protection. While discussing “Vision 4” or “Coastal Defense” the document lays
out goals for the next 10 years ranging from flood protection systems, levee installation,
investments in vulnerable coastal communities, energy improvements and so-called “naturebased” measures. (ONY 246) However, it commits to none and avoids a detailed explanation
of how the city plans to execute these highly complicated and logistically advanced
initiatives. Instead, one becomes party to a wild goose chase of donor-network relations
which indicate a complex web of funding with little tangible presence yet, now nearly five
years post-Sandy.
New York is at a critical impasse, as progress towards resilience would hopefully indicate
that New York City would be better equipped today to deal with an event such as what
happening in October 2012. Unfortunately, both these policy packages and current
administrative behavior indicate that this may not be the case. For example, although the
municipal government of New York City may state that their goal is to “…continue to align
zoning and building code updates with reforms to the National Flood Insurance Program and
expected changes to the Flood Insurance Rate Maps.” (One New York 232) They are fighting
tooth and claw to not fulfill this promise in real-time. In June, 2015 the Office of the Mayor
filed an appeal against FEMA’s most recent update to those very same maps. In the appeal,
the Mayor’s Office argues that the city disagrees with the methodology that FEMA has
employed, leading to a measurement of flood projections the city finds unacceptable. The
Office asserts, “Specifically, FEMA’s Preliminary FIRMs overstate Base Flood Elevations
(BFEs) by more than 2 feet in many areas across New York City and misrepresent the
Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA) by 35 percent, unnecessarily putting approx. 26k and
170k residents in the SFHA” (Office of the Mayor 2). As of October 17th, 2016, it seems that
the Mayor’s office won its appeal, as FEMA and the Mayor made a joint announcement to
redraw the floodplain maps, placing tens of thousands of homes along the coast in low-risk
zones.
This re-zoning belies a paradoxical mindset within the municipal government. This
dishonesty, be it malicious or otherwise, will ultimately result in the uneven distribution of
negative outcomes from future flooding. If zones which are indeed at risk are listed as lower
than suggested risk, what will stop current and future policy from simply overlooking the
need to protect these spaces? This situation resonates with what Burby calls the “safe
4

development paradox” that exists “when federal efforts to make inherently hazardous areas
safe for development in fact make them highly susceptible to disasters of catastrophic
proportions.” (2006) And as he demonstrates, this would go on to have severe consequences
for vulnerable populations across New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina.
This paper adds to the dialogue on resilience and governance by focusing on the
perspectives and stories of homeowners on the front lines of coastal vulnerability. Resilience
is being touted by proponents in the Office of the Mayor and private organizations such as
The Rockefeller Foundation as a dynamic and useful tool in the face of the many challenges
laid out before coastal cities. Through the language and actions of current administrations
and the investors and formulators who affect their policy, it is clear that grand narratives and
large scale maneuverings are being undertaken. The findings of this paper will demonstrate,
however, that the current state of resilience planning in New York City does not reflect the
perceptions of vulnerability and need expressed by members of a coastal community within
its bounds.

Environmental Instability as a Challenge to Governance
Climate change is a multilateral issue which presents the global community with many
challenges. Primarily, adapting to changing environmental dynamics and potential instability
arising from the political and economic dimensions of environmental crisis whilst also facing
the geographic disruption of population centers due to shifting coastlines are key issues. Here
a conceptual framework of resilience can be a guiding force for potential change. One of the
most prescient examples of this scenario is the current and future state of sea-bound
metropolises, i.e. cities such as New York, Boston or Miami.
What does a changing climate mean for coastal cities? Both real-time events and the
current literature paint an alarmingly clear picture. Hurricane Sandy and its aftermath
demonstrated the weakness of New York’s infrastructure to large scale flooding and the
disruption it brings. As Pirani and Tolkoff state, “It flooded key arteries in and out of New
York City, including the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel and Amtrak’s Hudson River tunnel. It
disabled power plants and transmission lines, leaving 8.5 million customers in three states
without electricity, some for weeks. The storm surge easily overtopped protective dunes and
floodwalls from Atlantic City to New London, damaging more than 600,000 homes and
killing 60 people.” (Pirani et al. 2014) Then Mayor Bloomberg’s policy response PlaNYC: A
Stronger More Resilient New York that, “Along the shoreline the storm surge smashed
buildings and engulfed entire communities. It flooded roads, subway stations, and electrical
facilities, paralyzing transportation networks and causing power outages that plunged
hundreds of thousands into darkness. Fires raged. Wind felled trees. Heartache and
hardship—and at least $19 billion in damage—are the storm’s legacy.” (NYC 2013) This
state of unpreparedness is nothing new. The gross level of infrastructural and governmental
failure in the face of full-scale natural disaster was first on display in this way nearly a
5

decade prior during Hurricane Katrina. Finally, the United States Senate stated in their
executive report Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared that:
“1) Long term warning went unheeded and government officials neglected their
duties to prepare for a forewarned catastrophe; 2) Government officials took
insufficient actions or made poor decisions in the days immediately before and after
landfall; 3) Systems on which officials relied on to support their response efforts
failed; and 4) Government officials at all levels failed to provide effective
leadership.” (2006: 2)
A pattern of government failure is well-documented with a number of scholars theorizing its
root causes. For some, bureaucratic bloat is often cited as an impediment to efficient
governance in times of crisis. As Sobel and Leeson state, layered bureaucracies and
centralized decision making are inherently slow and delay action. In many instances, this
sluggishness is beneficial and desired for governance, i.e. when implementing changes to the
law facilitates stability and the maintenance of stable legal environments. However, this
proves a double-edged sword, as even then Governor of Louisiana Kathleen Blanco
complained that it was impossible to break through this bureaucracy even at the highest level.
(2006)
In other cases, either an incidental or willful lack of attention to potential hazards on the
part of governing bodies is seen as attributing to the eventual failure. For example, Raymond
J. Burby states that what he terms the local government paradox occurs when local
authorities give insufficient attention to the threats posed by hazards when they willfully
allow continued development of potentially or known hazardous areas. In turn, the burden of
human suffering and financial ruin is then felt most heavily by the citizens when disasters
occur. He points out that this was plainly illustrated in New Orleans where the municipal
government actively supported heavy development in the eastern portion of the city, whilst
the Orleans Parish Levee Board remained staunchly unwilling to underwrite flood and
hurricane protection despite the known danger. (2006) Overall, the risk is clear. There is no
indication that the occurrence of storm events such as Sandy, and as such the need for
municipal policy to meet them, will diminish. In fact, current research shows that the
opposite will prove to be true more quickly than is currently thought. As Reed, et al. (2015)
state, pre-anthropogenic to current anthropogenic era rates of storm surge and flooding have
increased alongside rates of sea level rise, with the mean flood height having increased by
over 1.24 meters in that time. In addition, the changes to tropical cyclone activity brought on
by environmental shifts have also led to an increase in the severity of storms which produce
surges for New York City, yielding a net increase in flood risk for the region (2015).
However, the present state of government preparedness to deal with repeat events has yet to
be demonstrated in any meaningful sense.
These precedents, combined with the troublesome disconnect between what resilience
means to policymakers and what is required of it to serve coastal populations, creates a
defining political incoherence surrounding the governmental response to Hurricane Sandy in
6

New York. The problematizing issue at the heart of the governmental capacity to cope with
these responsibilities can be witnessed in the unearned political certainty of policy produced
by the municipality and the State to meet challenges that present as clear a danger to
constituents in vulnerable communities as they did before a single dollar was pledged to
resilience, but for whom little has changed five years later. Such is the case in communities
across the City who occupy space on exposed coastline, of which Sea Gate is one.

Sea Gate: The Research Setting
For its features as a private gated community as well as being at the fore of the coastal
turmoil that Hurricane Sandy brought, I chose Sea Gate located on the western shore of
Coney Island in southern Brooklyn, New York as the research site. My status as a former
resident who was present for the unfolding of Hurricane Sandy itself, uniquely positioned me
to conduct interviews and navigate the community as an insider without the need for a
gatekeeper. Here I provide background information on the community of Sea Gate itself, and
its status in regard to the governance, vulnerability, and resilience of city space.
Sea Gate is a private gated community. Land was development for what would
eventually become Sea Gate began in 1892 then known as Norton’s Point. The name came
from the lighthouse that still stands there today.2 During Hurricane Sandy, Sea Gate alone
saw roughly 750 homes damaged to differing degrees at an overall cost of $45 million to
residents. Not only was private property laid to waste, but external structures which served
as protection for the community, like the main bulkhead on the point, were destroyed during
the storm (Kensinger 2014). A unique feature of the damage that Sea Gate saw, beyond
merely that it occurred within an atypically private community, is the length of time it has
taken to recoup losses and rebuild. As Kensinger further points out, “Very little has changed
here in the past two years, and the landscape is littered with boarded up homes, empty lots
and abandoned construction projects.” (2014) This was an account made some years ago,
though now, in 2017, the situation has not evolved much further. Despite the fact that
various sources point to pledges made by the city or federal government to improve storm
resistance in the area, there has been no perceptible progress on the ground. This includes a
$2.8 million dollar grant for sea-wall construction which Kensinger eluded to in 2014, but
whose link on the Governor's Office of Storm Recovery is no longer operating. Also of note
are endeavors such as New York Rising which the New York Times cited in 2014 as
pledging $200 million to communities across the region but whose effects are imperceptible
to homeowners.
Meanwhile, though private communities exist all over the nation, they are rare within
the boundaries of greater New York City. The characterization and status of private
communities sets them apart from the surrounding area both in an ideological sense and in a
2
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direct governmental manner. In Private Communities or Public Governments: "The State
Will Make the Call", Rishikof and Wohl state:
“From the few progressive and utopian communities of the late nineteenth century, to
the early suburbanite developments at the beginning of the twentieth century, to the
growing popularization of organized community development in the middle of this
century," experiments in urban planning and building private communities have
existed in some form, albeit generally as a small percentage of cities or towns.
Homeowner's associations, for instance, have a long history in this country and
abroad. More recently, particularly in the last thirty years, amidst the fear of spiralling
crime and the dual developments of urban decay and urban gentrification, Americans
have turned increasingly to the security and style of life offered by private
communities, neighborhoods, and living associations" (1996: 512)
As a private community, the governance status of the space in a city which traditionally
has heavy municipal oversight is somewhat convoluted. One such homeowner’s association
as mentioned above oversees the internal administration of the community. This is the Sea
Gate Association. While residents pay city and state taxes as any New Yorker typically
would, they also pay dues to the Sea Gate Association. Meanwhile, while services like
Sanitation or Emergency Medical Transport are handled by the external services upon which
Brooklyn residents would normally rely, an independent Police force oversees the day to day
security and emergency response duties within the gates. As Rishikof and Wohl note:
“This dramatic change in the dynamics of community living presents the possibility
not only of physically reshaping neighborhoods and towns, but also restructuring
systems of community and interpersonal interaction, legal rights, and personal
responsibilities. At best, these communities may seem like idyllic living locales,
which serve to "enhanc[e] the sense of neighborhood identity and community."' These
efforts to achieve utopia, however, may also support communities which spur the
development of an "us versus them" mentality, keeping distance (and walls) between
those who are perceived as either economically, socially, or racially different” (1996:
515)
In the case of Sea Gate, this problematic occurrence centers more on an us versus them
narrative between the homeowners within the community, the Sea Gate Association, and the
municipal government at large in ways which will become elucidated further in the paper.
This liminal status can and will cause contention over the maintenance and responsibility
towards land, property and emergency response both in times of disruption and day to day
policy.

Methods & Methodology

8

Methodologically, my approach to this research largely dwells within the lens of
interpretive knowledge creation, recognizing the lived experience of vulnerability to coastal
disaster, assessments of government response, and knowledge of climate change and
resilience policy through the testimonies of residential homeowners within the target
neighborhood.
One-on-one interviews with the researcher (myself) and willing participants were
conducted between June and December 2016. The main subject population was residential
homeowners who were adversely affected by Hurricane Sandy, (i.e. experienced economic
and property loss as a result of storm damage). Individual informants were selected based on
the location of their residence within Sea Gate. Snowball sampling was also used to find
additional participants.
As a former resident of Sea Gate, I have first-hand knowledge of where storm damage
occurred. I used this knowledge to inform my sampling strategy. I also used photographic
and documentary evidence of storm damage throughout the community. These sources of
data helped me to create a purposeful sampling strategy that focused on depth of a
respondent’s experience rather than on completing as many interviews as possible.
Interviews were conducted independently with each chosen participant by myself at a place
of the participant’s choosing. Interviews were recorded digitally and stored until such time
as it could be transcribed. From this point transcriptions were arranged in groupings with the
aim of elucidating illustrative quotes which could carry the most prescient themes from the
data forward. From here, coding categories were deduced which best suited the themes
which recurred across the transcripts.
Respondents speak for themselves. Thusly, while I entered this research with guiding
interview questions, I did not enter with a pre-conceived coding framework. Rather, I
produced deductive codes which evolved from the data. In this way, I was best able to
capture the essence of what parties to whom I spoke relayed, and distilled it into academic
arguments.
When considering subjectivity, I am a former resident of the community to which I am
returning in order to conduct research. I was present during Hurricane Sandy and my own
family experienced both extensive property damage and temporary displacement. Therefore,
due to my biography, I was well positioned to conduct this study. Not only am I familiar
with the subject matter, but also well versed in the social dynamics of the neighborhood.
Regarding the ethical dimensions of this study, the research did not involve any
significant risks for the subjects. The questions pertained mostly to matters of vulnerability
perceived through a lens of private property and fiscal effects and governance issues
associated with post-Sandy response. There were no fatalities in Sea Gate during Hurricane
Sandy. Questions did not seek to create personal profiles of individuals. Rather, the focus of
the interview questions was to build towards a more communal understanding of how
respondents view the issues of vulnerability and governance as a collective whole once data
9

is collected. Therefore, no personal or political information regarding respondents was
included in the study unless where specifically required or requested by the respondent
themselves. Furthermore, participants were free to cease engagement with the study at any
time. That being said, without divulging enough information for anonymity to be breached,
some facts can be laid out about participants. Interviewees were middle to older-aged,
Caucasian, and while both male and female individuals were consulted, the majority of
participants were male. These trends were not due to any intentional canvassing or
preference for the study, but rather the result of who was available and willing to participate
at the time of my research.

Findings and Discussion
In the course of data analysis, a narrative emerged from the responses garnered during
interviews. This narrative places Sea Gate, or at the very least, representative residents
within the community, in the position of occupying a dynamic and nebulous space in the
landscape of New York City when considering governance, disaster relief, and ultimately,
resilience planning.
Three main themes emerged from the data. Namely, issues of Governance,
Vulnerability and Resilience stood as meta-categories for coding purposes. Under the
umbrella of Governance, sub-codes included Institutional Coordination, Infrastructural
Management and Beach Maintenance. Under the category of Vulnerability, sub-codes
included Fiscal Effects and Geographic Factors. Meanwhile, under the meta-category of
Resilience, the main sub-codes which emerged were Climate Awareness and Knowledge of
Policy.
Governance
Institutional Coordination – Infrastructural Management
One of the primary findings of this endeavor was that a common belief existed among
interviewees that the level of Institutional Coordination present in the immediate and
lingering aftermath of Hurricane Sandy was subpar in many respects. Not only was the
official municipal response from Greater NYC perceived as limited and ineffectual, but the
local response from the authorities present both on Coney Island and within Sea Gate itself
was seen as relatively piecemeal or unclear. To establish this in the present, however, it is
necessary to examine how this belief has underpinnings in past experience as well. It was
reflected by several statements made by an interviewee that they had carried a latent distrust
of the ability of the state to care for them in times of crisis. Indeed they stated:
“I did not expect to have any support services and the reason I evacuated and urged
my neighbor to evacuate was because of seeing Katrina victims on their rooftops. I
did not have faith in our community being able to provide support because of our
location. Geographically, I live on an island, and the bridge may have not been
10

accessible, it may have been destroyed. In the previous year, during Hurricane Irene
situations, neighborhoods were dramatically effected with flooding and we were very,
very lucky not to be hit. We were prepared and we evacuated but nothing happened. I
had a sense of complacency about the severity of the storm but I still evacuated
because I knew things were getting worse with the storms and with the services.
We’ve had snowstorms in which our community could not be dug out for four days,
you know, creating problems with access to transportation, ambulance[s] and work,
so being in that situation frequently made me cognizant of the fact that if I did not
evacuate I would be leaving myself open to whatever could happen.”
Furthermore, in regards to the status quo of infrastructure it was evidenced in several
statements that this sense of service disruption or potential service bias existed as a sort of
cursory baseline. This is present in the following statements:
“Yes at times. We did have electrical problems, and Bus service was actually
discontinued by the New Yok City transit system in Sea Gate, requiring residents to
walk or drive to access the rest of the transit system. So it was always a difficult
commute to get to the subway…”
And:
“The infrastructure is limited, the services they provide, but I would expect that
because we pay the same property taxes as everyone else in NYC, whatever services
everyone else is entitled to, we should have, that we are getting that? No.”
Or:
“This is a unique….when you are talking about Sea Gate, it’s like, as far as I’m
aware, this went back with Giuliani, when he said, you know, take down the gates,
the Reagan-esque thing, and then you have services. People want to keep their
privacy but then they charge us the same property taxes so we are paying for
nothing.”
Another respondent offered a more tempered but still problematizing view:
“I wouldn’t say there was a complete failure of services, but I would say that what I
saw was a lot of struggling on the part of the city to, you know, respond. They were
overwhelmed.”
Even something as fundamental as regular phone access was perceived as not wholly
reliable:
“Not having the need for any specific services, the answer to that would be no, not
necessarily. But the only thing that’s bad here, as you know, is the telephones. For
some reason that and the electricity, with this locale I think it has to do with wires
being above ground and not underground, something along that line…”
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Due to this perceived lack of confidence in the ability of state actors or organizations to
necessarily be “on the ball”, members of the community to whom I spoke entered Hurricane
Sandy without much faith in the City or any of its preventative measures to stop the worst
effects of storm fallout. Rather, most of the participants prepared for Sandy with the vague
hope that the storm would simply pass like so many before it and that an act of chance would
be their saving grace.
Meanwhile, in the actual wake of the storm, the respondents perceived major gaps in
services provided with one exception. The sanitation department appeared to be actively
functioning better than the police force and various emergency response services as one
interviewee stated:
“The only agency that I saw that actually functioned well was the sanitation
department. Because they picked up garbage, they came around, the guys were
empathetic, they got guys in from Queens that were working, they said ‘oh geez’ you
know. I don’t recall seeing any other except for the Hasidic “police” but they all
went to the members, you know that didn’t pertain to me, but they were patrolling
and they knew we lived here but they were a private organization because you know
our police organization was gone. Did a private organization take up the slack? Yes,
they knew we lived here. But that was about all.”
Another participant confirmed this when they said:
“The police told us that we had to watch out, that there were looters around out the
other side of the fences. They were spread too thin, they couldn’t actively patrol
everything, and their headquarters had been wiped out by the storm surge. When I
think back to that, it makes me think about getting some sort of self-defense for the
future. No-one was there to protect anyone, and we didn’t have any power.”
However, it was not as if knowledge of the potential danger from the sea was without
precedent. Certainly, storms had caused intermittent disruption before, though it had been
some time since major damage had been inflicted by weather related events. One participant
stated:
“In 1991, December 11 or 12-13th, we had a severe storm in which our residence was
hit by waves at the level of the second floor. We were ordered to evacuate but we did
not heed the orders to evacuate. On the ocean side of the community a house fell into
the ocean and it was a pretty scary thing to experience.”
And while this precedent existed, it was not as if any set protocol or plan was in place for
residents should flooding occur again. Ordering evacuations was perceived ‘well and good’,
but it did not belie a deeper level of planning or coordination. As one respondent states:
“Right now, they’re not going to do anything over here. That’s basically it. That’s
why that’s an interesting point. If you were to get the New York Times in here, are
we the only community in the United States that faces this? [It’s a] possibility.”
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This sense of idleness existing on the part of the “powers that be” feeds into the
aforementioned cycle of mistrust which exists between Sea Gate residents and the
municipality at large. However, where this mistrust may exist as an above average level of
skepticism during times of stability, during a crisis it can easily be observed as transforming
into a more palpable sense of fear, where it presents clear existential threats. Take, for
example, this account, where one respondent describes the experience of homeowners
throughout the community being hassled by suspicious men claiming to be city employees
sent to inspect the electrical fuses in houses. Not only were they charging money for said
inspections but they were armed with the threat that homes could not be reconnected to the
grid without performing one:
“The criminality…you know my plumber came back here and said it looked like
Algeria where he had come from. He said now that the water is gone, watch, the
‘sharks’ are going to come out. They were pulling out…you know people got caught
that were gullible, they all claimed they were federal workers but who knows what
they were. So the sharks came out, now were they sanctioned by the government? It
would apparently seem so, so some of them were legitimate sharks. But you didn’t
know which ones. Would I have known not to let the guy look at my box, the
electrician and let him put a thing on it?” He came 12 o’clock at night saying to put it
on you know, ‘oh we gotta take it out you were flooded you’re in an A zone’…”
Ultimately, this all feeds into Sea Gate’s status as a gated community in Brooklyn,
which complicates its position in the grand scheme of things during times of stability, let
alone in the wake of a natural disaster. This relationship emerged as a persistent obstacle to
governance in the area, where respondents seem to perceive a complicated system of
mismanagement existing both between themselves and the Sea Gate Association and
between the community itself and the rest of New York proper. Consider this statement:
“The only thing you could do, see, if you focus on those issues, I guarantee you, you
could get all the local newspapers to write articles on that. Because they are totally
unaware of what is going on, because nobody knows that Sea Gate exists, you see,
and the Board, the mentality is that we don’t want anybody to know, and if they know
we’re going to wind up getting punished, and having been on the Board, getting
punished for what? To the best of my knowledge we’re paying city dues and Sea Gate
dues, and if you have a single family house, your Sea Gate dues you can’t deduct.
They don’t even know, they’re chopping off their foot to battle their toes.”
Here we have not only a demonstration of the perception that Sea Gate and its residents are
unseen or invisible to the city itself, but also that they shoulder a greater burden, paying
taxes/dues both to the city at large and to the local administration for the upkeep of the
community, but receiving little perceptible benefit for the trouble. In particular, the interplay
between the New York City government and Sea Gate’s own administration is relevant to
this discourse because it effects how responsibility is partitioned for certain services and
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infrastructural oversight within the bounds of the gates. One respondent points out in regard
to the history of sanitation services in the community:
“And then I said, how come we have sanitation? I looked at the history, looking at the
history of Coney Island and it only ever touches peripherally on Sea Gate, but if you
go back and look at the stuff…where did…how did…what happened in the early
‘60’s was there was a deal made…but a deal made by whom, in writing? Where?
Where is the document that says we are getting sanitation, because basically if we are
a private community we shouldn’t be, so they don’t want to bring that thing up
because it might affect snow plows, it’s one or the other. So they’re thing is its better
not to open up that one, and since he [Sea Gate Board chairman] opened up the door
in other places, I have no problem opening up the doors other places too.”
From this kind of narrative also emerges a latent sense of frustration against the local Sea
Gate Association in regard to their stewardship of this public/private relationship, where they
are interpreted as acting advantageously in some regards and underperforming in others. One
statement reads:
“And here are the other problems, with our quasi status, we’re neither fish nor fowl,
since, you know, when I was on the board you know and people say ‘Oh they’re
robbing money!’, well if they are they would have to be very smart because I didn’t
see it, but if you want to say oh they’re stupid, they’re arrogant, yeah I could see
situations where that occurs.”
Intrinsically, this frustration seems to constitute an underlying dispute over whose
responsibility certain actions normally overseen by government in one form or another are,
with several parties potentially being culpable in various situations, whilst none emerge to
take up this mantle. This, in turn, is then perceived as all actors involved washing their hands
of any accountability and leaving problems unresolved.
Vulnerability
Fiscal Effects & Geographic Factors
The main narrative regarding fiscal effects throughout the respondent pool was one of
extensive damage that was costly but possible to recoup one way or another. The difficulty
experienced by each household differed primarily around how much time and effort was
invested in either obtaining financial compensation or physical labor to rebuild. However,
cause to celebrate was scarce as all respondents bore an awareness that the open-ocean facing
homes bore incredible damage, some being swept completely away, and worry over future
damage is still high. Meanwhile, narratives also emerged that painted a picture of insecurity
around the external framing of the vulnerability within the community, citing fears that
preconceptions about wealth and stability would prevent protective measures from being
taken in the future.
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On the one hand some respondents were quite content because they received coverage
from their private insurance:
“They wouldn’t cover some things but it didn’t matter because they covered
everything else.”
Or:
“My experience was really, compared to everybody else, OK, you know going to
court and fighting, but then I wasn’t looking to make any money on this deal, I just
wanted to go on with my life. I came to retire to a beach in Brooklyn, you know, I
look at the grass grow. That’s just the way it is. This is the perfect place for sedentary
people.”
However, others still had serious qualms over how federal aid was administered, saying they
were lucky they had private insurance because Federal aid never came. In one case, a
respondent asserted that they perceived a socio-economic bias at play in the way FEMA
responded to certain households, in their view:
“Private Insurance. I got no Federal, I was not entitled to any Federal compensation
because, you know, I worked for fifty years. This Federal compensation, FEMA and
all that, because we have to be…they don’t pay, which is the same thing with FEMA,
the only way that they pay with FEMA is if you find some flaw. We were entitled to
200 or 500 dollars, there was really nothing for a person like me because they told me
I could pay, therefore there was nothing for me, the flood didn’t affect me in their
eyes.”
And again, a mock conversation with FEMA was requoted:
“Why are you prejudiced against me? [Addressing FEMA] Aren’t I a victim?
[FEMA] ‘Yeah but you can afford it.’”
Even still exasperation was expressed at being denied coverage by a contractual technicality
which they interpreted as unethical and hostile. Part of their statement was:
“The only thing I could think of…as outstanding issues is the sand…not now but in
the years to come. The only other thing is I did get screwed with the insurance on the
Auto but that had to with that I had leased a car. And I knew someone who worked at
GM and she told me, ‘Yeah, I knew that was in their contract but I never saw anyone
get hit with it’ but I got hit with it. And I mean even an attorney, no one would think,
oh that clause is going to cost you 7,000 dollars, and I had the car in the garage.”
While this extreme was not present across the entire group of respondents, it is important
enough to stand out in that it demonstrates another layer of disconnect between the
community of Sea Gate and the greater area of New York and southern Brooklyn to which it
belongs. Whether real or perceived, such divisions will have an effect going forward on the
ways in which homeowners in the area feel their needs are being considered.
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A consistent narrative of intense physical damage emerged from the data, with
homeowners recounting how much had been lost, in terms of space and time. One
respondent stated:
“What can I say? The whole lower floor was inundated, the water came up higher
than it ever had before in recent memory. The permanent structure was intact but the
entire first floor had to be gutted and rebuilt…I did all of the reconstruction myself,
the walls needed to be rebuilt with mold resistant boarding, the electricity had to be
rewired completely….its a project that is never finished, I’m still working on it to this
day. I think of time often as before and after Sandy now, given the impact it had.
This is not even to mention the possessions we lost because we couldn’t take
everything upstairs…decades worth of things, some of them irreplaceable…gone.
Even to this day, I will pick things up and move them downstairs and water from
Sandy will spill out, stuff that’s been trapped for years now, its like it hasn’t fully
left.”
Indeed, the fiscal aspect of this experience has been equally enduring, where the process of
receiving compensation is still underway:
“Oh sure, the private insurance didn’t give us trouble after they came to inspect the
house, though it took some time. I remember the day, it was so cold it was flurrying
and we still did not have electricity, this was in November after the storm, we were
using a propane heat lamp to warm the house to keep the cold and damp at
bay…prevent mold…But the FEMA compensation is still coming in to this day, just
in the past few months we have received more in the mail from them. Its great, but if
we had been reliant on that assistance [alone?] we would have been out of luck.”
It is imperative to note that while the respondents I spoke to were, on the whole, financially
capable of withstanding the cost of the damage dealt, many in other parts of the community
were not, and are now gone because they could not rebuild, especially on the ocean-facing
side of the island. The socio-economic characteristics of Sea Gate are not homogenous, and
while there are areas of the community which house more financially secure households,
there are many more which are middle-income on a varying level. In this regard, the great
equalizer herein is the geographic position of the community as a whole, and when
formulating resilience policy for future scenarios, this category cannot be overlooked.
While the fiscal aspect of the community’s vulnerability is important, perhaps the most
vital and problematic aspect of Sea Gate’s vulnerability are the inherent geographic facts of
its existence. In turn, this geographic reality feeds back into the fiscal viability of the
community itself. The most immediate and obvious aspect of this positionality is the ever
present risk of flood waters. One respondent stated:
“One of the problems here, right, and I saw just in Sea Gate, with the water in the
street, you know the reason there was water in the street. It didn’t come from my
house, because once it came in, you know we live on a slab, [name] lives on a slab, it
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came in and it went out. Now [name] and everyone else who had basements, it didn’t
come out. Now if you’re going to find out what FEMA is going to pay and in the
meantime it causes mold problems……Why do they build on the beach, that was
absolutely ridiculous, and no insurance pays for stuff in the basement anyway, so in
other words how do you resolve that problem? We could pay….but what about the
person who inherited the property and they can’t even pay insurance or even live in a
house like this, so that’s another problem that the Federal Gov’t., you know anytime
you make regulations and have a big brother thing you create problems. The only
thing you could do is that anyone who lives in any area like this must have insurance.
You know when I was buying this my lawyer said to me make sure you have flood
insurance, don’t worry about the mortgage.”
This sentiment is further echoed in another statement:
“People who are actually….you shouldn’t have a house on the beach if you can’t
afford it, but for people who inherit it or don’t have insurance. It’s a problem how do
you resolve it? You punish one to reward another? Is that a solution to a problem?”
Furthermore, worries over the state of flood insurance and proximity to the water were
present:
“The way it works here in Sea Gate, we’re grandfathered in here the way it was
before, but the new owner, they are gonna pay what they are gonna pay in an A zone
area, so what the hell could they charge? I hear people on the Bay streets, they wanted
10 or 12 thousand dollars for flood insurance, so what the heck would you have here,
and there they aren’t even going to flood?”
This line of worry leads directly into the most recent update in the area, which is the
aforementioned New York City appeal of FEMA’s floodplain mapping. Inherent to Sea
Gate’s geographic location as the jutting western edge of Coney Island is its potential for
flooding, and Hurricane Sandy demonstrated aptly that in our new era of increasing climate
instability and unpredictable storms, the potential for flooding is greater than ever before.
FEMA’s floodplain mapping attested to this, but its conclusions were overturned successfully
by the City government on the grounds that extensive predictions for future disaster would
put undue burdens on the city and its residents. This action has seen an immediate change
come to homeowners in Sea Gate whose properties lie at the water’s edge. Recently, one
interviewee gave their appraisal of this shift:
“I really couldn’t believe it. Here we are, a stone’s throw from the water, and all of a
sudden I’m ‘preferred non-risk’ according to my insurance company. My flood
premium’s gone down by thousands. That’s great, to have less bills, but what does
this mean for me? Is that going to stop the next storm? I don’t think so, nothing has
actually changed. I didn’t know about the lawsuit or FEMA’s role until after this all
happened, none of it was publicized, you didn’t see it in any news, you had to look it
up for yourself, there was no engagement.”
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And another respondent echoes this sentiment:
“I feel betrayed, honestly. Yeah, it’s great to see your bill go down but we are not
low risk, we know that, anyone who was here for Sandy knows that. You ask
yourself why they would do this, and I can’t think of any good reason. FEMA was
just observing what actually happened to these parts, what will happen to the coast.
These people in the city…I don’t think they are living in reality. If they don’t think
we are at risk, who is going to help us next time?” Look at what happened out at
Breezy Point…the whole place burned down. How can they think places like this are
lower risk than FEMA said?”
Clearly, there was some sense of worry over the implications of this move, most importantly
the primary fear being one of how it alters where the City will place Sea Gate in future plans
if they are choosing externally to relate to it as a non-risk entity on a financial level. Such
questions are highly relevant and this sentiment transitions well into what was gleaned from
the data as being a part of the knowledge-base of the residents to whom I spoke on issues
pertinent to Resilience both locally and within New York City at large.
Resilience
Climate Awareness and Knowledge of Policy
Overall, residents to whom I spoke were highly conscious of the risks of residing near
the sea. In addition, most were largely aware of current state of climate science and the
predominant ideas about how warming seas contribute to both rising sea levels and increased
storm frequency and severity. When asked about their awareness of such issues and how, if
at all, they perceived them to effect Sea Gate, one respondent answered:
“I actually will not stay here, I have since made plans to move. I now have a
residence elsewhere, and from now on will not live in a coastal community for any
reason. I do not feel that our population is aware of the risks and while homes are
being bought and sold here and while houses are being rebuilt on stilts I think it is
foolish to rebuild where nature will reclaim.”
Another response shared this sentiment:
“The risks from the water are absolutely high. I no longer wish to reside here. It’s a
big problem in my personal life that I am still living here. I want to leave, and it is
imperative to me that I move my family out.”
Yet another interviewee states:
“It’s always a risk, it’s always a risk [living near the sea] and with Sandy we were a
bit thrown off because, you know, we had Irene the year before which was like, you
know was like a direct hit, and nothing happened. So then with Sandy, I think
everyone was caught off guard…, they hadn’t got all their stuff out, and I got hit with
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stuff like artworks and paperwork and stuff like that. And what I would have done
was bring some stuff upstairs like computers and hard drives but that’s all gone…”
Further still, another response explains:
“Certainly, like, anytime a storm hits the Atlantic Coast it could be you, but this one
was just like a weird everything conspired together so the water surge and we had the
wind and it was rising and the tide was rising but there was also the Full Moon tide.
And sometimes it’s gonna happen and you just hope…and lots of times we got real
lucky, like hurricanes just stalled off the coast and they went away. It would be naïve
to say it couldn’t happen, and its just like denial if you think it isn’t going to happen
again.”
While all interviewees had a keen awareness that the sea posed a danger and a risk, and most
had an awareness of climate change related issues, the connection between the two was not
necessarily made. For example, one respondent, who had previously elaborated on his/her
risk from the sea also made the following statement:
“I’m sure the climate changes, you know, however many umpteen thousands of years
the climate is going to change, but I haven’t witnessed any climate change, it’s not
apparent here. And, you know, supposedly the water level here is rising, but I can’t
say that I’ve seen it.”
This was a minority view to note. When the connection between the two bodies of evidence
was made, some respondents had high literacy in the pertinent information. The following
response illustrates a highly informed view:
“Certainly, the risk is terminal. I don’t think people will be able to live here much
longer. Not in your lifetime, maybe in mine, but I don’t want to stay here long term
anymore. I’ve been here for over 30 years, and it’s time to go. Where am I going?
Anywhere but the coast, maybe mountains. With sea level rise and the storms that we
could be in for down the line, a beach like this isn’t the place to be any longer. I have
nightmares of the waves coming over the house. And this place is unique, there is
nowhere else like this in the whole city with this view, this exposure. The sea is the
sea, though, and the city sure isn’t doing anything to help places like this. They’ll
take care of the public spaces but even then, what can they do? This was all water
before, and it’s going to be again, I suppose.”
Having established a baseline understanding of where community awareness sat in
regard to climate change, sea risk, and its related effects, the next task was to discern what
level of knowledge, if any, was present amongst homeowners regarding the New York City
Resilience plans emerging from the Office of the Mayor. Furthermore, a secondary objective
was to discover what level of engagement was perceived as currently existing between the
crafters of said policies and the people whom they will affect. When questioned about this
topic, the first response garnered was:
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“No, and the only thing that I heard Bloomberg say, when he was mayor before out
esteemed DeBlasio came in was, he had looked at what they did in the
Netherlands/Holland about putting up a wall somewhere over there so that the water
would be…but that was just talk, like with what they’re saying now was there any
money or anything, and as soon as he went, that went. That’s the only thing I have
heard. And if there were anything I would really be curious because I don’t think
there is.”
Yet another interviewee states:
“Zero. There is zero engagement between the City and Private Sector and Citizens in
regard to planning. It’s sort of like the time when my wife had cancer and there were
complications and the doctor told me ‘I can’t talk to you, you’re not a doctor.’ I was
later told you would have had a wonderful case if your wife had died. But because
she didn’t, since she was alive, he could say it was due to my work she didn’t die,
because you can’t prove something like that…it’s like could I prove that that sand is
gonna cause me damage so I can sue them? It’s like those catch 22’s.”
This narrative of a communicatory blackout between private citizens (and specifically those
in a coastal community like Sea Gate) and the directors of resilience policy within the city
was consistent across all findings. Of particular note also is the fact that despite its ubiquity
in the field and the regularity with which the City of New York publishes policy packages
containing the word, Resilience as a term denoting preparation for future climate impacts was
a relatively unfamiliar concept to almost everyone with whom I spoke. This in and of itself
denotes at least some level of information dissemination dysfunction in a municipality billed
as a global resilience leader. Another respondent stated:
“Noone has spoken to us, not from the city directly. Of course, we talked to some
people from FEMA after the storm throughout the process of acquiring assistance, but
never anyone directly involved with New York management. And no information
has been relayed to us, we don’t get any updates on what the city is doing. For all
intents and purposes, everything is back to as if Sandy had never happened.
Occasionally you see the Army Corps. Of Engineers out in the water doing this or
that, but they’ve been fiddling with the sand for years, so that is nothing new.
Certainly if a storm had hit again this Fall we would have been every bit as
susceptible as four years ago, nothing has changed.”
Ultimately then, it seemed as though the perceived status of municipal activity veered
towards stagnation, if not outright regression. While the City of New York has indeed been
active at least in a policy production manner, this form of activity has not trickled down to
the ground level, and first-line victims of a lack of resilience building still view themselves as
existing in an unchanged space comparative to before Sandy, if not a worse one.
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Conclusions
Using the data presented above, a number of issues present in Sea Gate pose a
significant challenge to the narrative of progressive resilience planning within New York
City. These are challenges that will need to be overcome if the city’s “resilience dividend” is
ever to be met. First and foremost, the issue of governance in times of crisis within New
York is highly problematized by the residents within Sea Gate. The scattered, piecemeal
response to storm damage, displacement and service deprivation experienced by respondents
to this study speaks to an underlying disorganization which mirrors previous accounts of
governmental retreat and failure within the literature during scenarios such as Hurricane
Katrina. This endemic issue is further complicated by the status of Sea Gate as a private
community within an already highly bureaucratic city, further saddled by its own
dysfunctional internal administration. This interplay serves to muddy the waters during the
imminent aftermath of a natural disaster, and various organizations with ties to the
community through either local or municipal chains of command were absent during
Hurricane Sandy due to this.
Meanwhile, in the present, the most potent example of the local/municipal dichotomy in
Sea Gate is seen in the contention over beach management, where the maintenance of sandbound property has become a battleground for citizen versus municipal rights to land. While
seemingly arbitrary, this issue has grave consequences for the future resilience of Sea Gate as
a coastal entity. The proper upkeep of the beach property on the Gravesend Bay facing shore
of the community determines flood-based damage in the eyes of the homeowners currently
sitting in the path of the sea. Furthermore, a willingness to allow for this upkeep on the part
of the City administration and the local Sea Gate Association will ultimately convey to
homeowners whether the individuals and institutions of power present truly consider their
plight worthy of stewardship, and thus this issue begs its own investigation, though it did not
fit in this study.
Furthermore, levels of climate awareness in the respondent pool indicate that residents
within Sea Gate are highly aware of both the current and future threats that the sea and
environmental issues present to their households, financial stability, and ultimately, their way
of life. Some respondents felt this weight so severely that they now live in fear or are in the
process of arranging to move away due to an overarching lack of confidence in the city to
adapt to the precarious situation Sea Gate and other coastal communities like Breezy Point
find themselves in across Brooklyn and Greater New York.
And yet, while all this is playing out, the City administration successfully appealed the
status of Sea Gate and other coastal communities across New York City, altering their status
and lowering their insurance premiums. With this move, mixed emotions emerged from the
community, who while glad to have lower payments were simultaneously confused by a
scenario which did not line up with facts they knew to be self-evident. The sea is as close as
it has ever been, and homeowners are aware that another Hurricane Sandy could be just a
season away, so they question what it means for them to have been listed as lower-risk in
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regard to potential inundation. As pointed out earlier, this action on the part of the NYC
administration reeks of what Burby called the safe development paradox. It would seem that
the city is attempting to halt the potential deleterious economic effect that declaring the entire
Brooklyn coastline a danger-zone could have by simply ignoring the problem. Or at least
that is what it looks like from the perspective of the people on the ground. Properties are still
being sold, developments still being undertaken, and areas which were flooded or burned to
the ground in Sandy actively rebuilt and repopulated. It is not a leap of logic to assume that,
like Burby witnessed in the case of New Orleans, the short-term financial boom of positive
development levels in potentially at-risk areas is outweighing the long-term goal of keeping
communities safe from natural disasters and hazards.
This paper argues that the reality of coastal community experience as told by residents
of Sea Gate presents a different view of a resilient New York City than the one present in
former Mayor Bloomberg’s PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York and now Mayor
Bill DeBlasio’s One New York policy packages. Certainly, this “real” New York also
diverges greatly from their model The Rockefeller Foundation’s and Judith Rodin’s
“resilience dividend”. Due to this, changes need to be made as quickly as possible if the
actual needs of coastal communities in New York City are to be met before the next Sandy
comes along. It is of primary importance that the City government take seriously the
findings of the FEMA floodplain mapping which emerged after Hurricane Sandy, and
benchmark administrative disasters such as Hurricane Katrina should provide ample evidence
for the need of local officials to take heed of early warnings. Furthermore, specifically to Sea
Gate’s experience, the problematic relationship between the local homeowner’s association
and the municipal government must be mediated and made more clear. Perhaps, after
decades of neglect, the beach management crisis currently unfolding could serve as the
staging ground for building a more efficient and equitable system between the two parties.
Finally, I recommend that further research on the ecological history of Coney Island and
other coastal areas of high population density which mirror Sea Gate’s precarious status
could shed further light on the path that sensible resilience planning for these communities
could take. Interference by the Army Corps. Of Engineers over the years has fundamentally
changed the topography of Sea Gate within the author’s lifetime, and the historical status of
these coastlines must be taken into account when planning to protect them from future
inundation. As Cronon states, “An ecological history begins by assuming a dynamic and
changing relationship between environment and culture, one as apt to produce contradictions
as continuities.” (13) This is a notion which is especially true in coastal cities, as a
population’s relationship with the sea and coastal land is consistently shifting, evolving, and
being engineered. Certainly, this is true for New York where the coast has been dramatically
expanded and much of the city today was once below water (Taylor 2012). This leaves a
multitude of people at the mercy of whatever may lie ahead, rather than sound policy and the
safety that organization and government is supposed, at least in theory, to ensure.
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Ultimately, if the issues illuminated in this paper are not dealt with, serious backdraft in
the form of unintended consequences and further disruption will be the legacy of current
policy initiatives. This would be a shame, for the ability of current municipal policy to meet
these needs boils down to the simple responsibility of the City government to hear its
constituents. As this paper demonstrates, these stories are out there, people on the coast
know the danger they face, and while “Cities” as conglomerate commercial and political
entities seek to raise their profile in a burgeoning field, the true resilience of the most
geographically vulnerable communities is being left up to chance.
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